advanced in favor of the path-independence properties. Section 4 contains a discussion of what I consider to be the major "path-independence" type axiom offered here. Its motivation, interpretation, simple mathematical structure, and relationship with rationality conditions are outlined. Section 5 contains two additional axioms. These two axioms are presented as attempts to capture the essence of a second motivation for path independence, which, I suspect, is closer to that which Arrow had in mind. These two axioms are discussed and connected to rationality conditions. The final section is a discussion of the general possibility theorem in view of the results presented here.
NOTATION AND SYMBOLS
Let the set of all conceivable "social states" be designated as E. Each element of E is taken as a complete description of the relevant universe. What is "relevant" depends upon the model. In terms of some broad sociopolitical-economic model, an element of E could be a complete description of the consumption and production activities of each economic agent (including receiving and discharging pollutants), and/or bills passed by the legislature, and/or the resolution of every conflict situation.
Consider an arbitrary subset v of E. We say the "social choice" over v is a subset of v. That is, C(v) c v where C(v) is the set of "chosen" elements. In case v is a consumption possibility set for an economy, then C(v) could be the competitive equilibria, or the core of the economy, or possibly even a von NeumannMorgenstern solution. The point is, C(v) can be viewed as the set of outcomes (allowing for the possibility of non-unique solutions)2 of some decision process, whether the process is economic, sociological, or political. The only requirement is that the function C(v) be dictated by the socio-economic laws governing the process.3 For purposes of exposition, the set v will be called the "agenda."
A set of v, or a family of subsets of E, V = {V1,... , VM} will be called the "admissible agenda." This is the collection of sets for which the social choice operates. For example, for E = {x, y, z} it could be the case that V = {I{x,y}, {x,z}, {x, y, z}} . In a limited sense, it is the set of "situations" which might face a society. In the case of an economy, it would be the family of consumption possibility sets, any one of which might conceivably occur. In the case of a legislature, it is a family of sets of proposals which a legislature might face. The precise nature of the admissible agenda is dependent upon the problem. We assume C(v) # 0 for any admissible v, except, of course,for v = 0, as part of the structure of the problem.
There may be parameters on the social choice function other than v. For example, the choice may depend not only on v but also on individual attitudes about the elements of E. In case individuals have "preferences" over E, we could 2 For a discussion of game-theoretic interpretations of such choice structures, see [9, 17, and 18] . 3We can view the choice function as either itself a model of a process or a model of a model of a process. In either case, the "facts" directly or indirectly are taken as giving the choice function its form. For a review of many of the models that have been developed, see Plott [9] . designate Ri as the preference relation of the ith individual and, where there are n individuals, write the choice function as C(v, R1,.. ., Rj) C v. This would indicate that the choice from v is a subset of v, but the particular subset chosen depends upon the vector of individual preference relations. Where D is a set of "admissible" vectors of individual preference relations, the 4-tuple <D, E, V, C(-)> has been called a constitution. 4 The analysis here will proceed,for the most part, on the assumption that individual tastes are fixed. Consequently, the additional notation will be dropped. That is, we shall assume individual tastes and other parameters to be fixed even though the agenda may change. The notation C(v) is simpler than C(v, R1, R2, .. ., Rn) where the bar indicates-a constant. Since individual preferences will be assumed fixed, the broad construction of a constitution is unnecessary. The relevant information will be carried simply as < V, C( )>, where V is the family of admissible agenda and C(Q) is the choice function.
Of the many aspects of the pair <V, C( )> that could be investigated, only one is of interest here-the rationality properties of <V, C( )>. Technically speaking, the choice C(Q) is rational in case there exists a "preference" relation that "rationalizes" it: that is, in case there exists a binary relation, R, such that for every admissible v, the choice C(v) is the set of "maximal" elements in v, according to the binary relation R.' Consider the example V = {{x, y}, {y, z} } and suppose C({x, y}) = {x} and C({y, z}) = {y, z}. Now xPy, xPz, yIz is a transitive rationalization while xPy, yIz, xIz is an intransitive rationalization of the same data. 6 Notice the concept of rational choice does not presuppose that the rationalization of any given data is necessarily transitive. In fact, the concept presupposes no properties of the rationalization at all, other than that it must be a binary relation. Of course, the given data themselves will induce properties on rationalizations. Classifications of rationalizations, or "degrees of rationality," such as total, reflexive, transitive, etc., can be listed.7 Analysis could then proceed on the relationships between data that would guarantee that any rationalization would be in one or more of these various classes. This will be the procedure used here, but interest will be limited to simply one or two types of rationalizations.
WHY RATIONAL SOCIAL CHOICE?
In a very real sense the "degree" of rationality imposed on or required in a constitution depends upon one's view of society and, more importantly, one's view of the purposes of social choice theory. Unfortunately, the question "why rational For the development and discussion of this construction, see [9] . Formally, a binary relation R rationalizes, or is a rationalization of, < V, C( )> in case (Vv),vC(v)= {x e v: (Vy),6vxRy}. If R is a rationalization of <V, C( )>, it is said to induce C() over V. 6 The relations of aP,B and acl# are defined as aR,B & -BRa, and aR,B & ,BRa, respectively, where R is the rationalization. In this particular example we have from the observed choices that any rationalization must have the properties xRy and -yRx and yRz and zRy. For this example, any binary relation with these properties is a rationalization. Evidently, some view society as an organism (thinking? feeling?) with a "personality," "preference," or "interest" all of its own which is independent of the preferences of individuals. Of course, if one has such a view, requirements of "rationality" would be a natural thing to incorporate in a social choice model. The "degree" of rationality exhibited by choice would, presumably, be the same as that of other "independent" agents, such as individuals, unless, of course, one sees that fellow named Society as having a "deviant personality."
Many of the efforts in the literature are attempts to define or abstractly quantify something called a "social preference." Operationally, it is difficult to distinguish efforts which are motivated from this point of view from those having the motivation outlined in the paragraph above.8 The reason for the difficulty in making the distinction at the operational level is that no one has outlined a convention for determining the bases on which the "social preference" can be judged to be successfully defined. Arrow, on the one hand, appears to be motivated at times by the simple personal feeling that acceptable social choice processes must necessarily be characterized by some sort of consistency. Similarly, Sen [15] views an identification of the "most preferred" to be some sort of inherent precondition to choice. The ground rules for the discussion have not been set.
If one is to speak of social choices as the "most preferred," the "best," or the "optimal," then just from the meaning of the words alone9 it would follow that choice must be consistent with some binary relation. Of course, there are many candidates for properties required of the binary relation (total? quasi-transitive? transitive?), and this procedure apparently provides no basis for choosing from among them. It is also true that this view never really supplies a reason forjustifying 8 I suppose those who are of the persuasion outlined in the first paragraph could proceed by introspection-"what would I do if I were it?" -"it" being society.
' Suppose x is judged "fair" when the possibilities are (x, y), y is judged "fair" when the possibilities are (z, y), and z is judged "fair" when the possibilities are (x, z). This result does not seem so "odd" to some, whereas to substitute "better" for "fair" would be in violation of their understanding of the words "better" and "best." Put another way, to some, what is "fair" may depend upon the agenda. This is analogous to an argument for the possibility of employing a different social welfare function for every production possibility set. the demand that social choices be restricted to those which are consistent with some concept of "best" in the first place. I suspect that those who appear to subscribe to this point of view feel that the ethic, "the alternatives most preferred by society should be chosen," would be universally accepted if the "proper" definition of "social preference" were provided.
A procedure of demanding the existence of an indicator of "social welfare" which is independent of the particular production possibilities set, has been a basic tenet of almost all welfare economics stemming from Bergson."0 Indeed, the directions as given by the welfare function are frequently taken to be the point from which the applied welfare economist departs. Exactly why the directions must necessarily come in this particular form is not thoroughly discussed. I suspect there has been a presupposition that the definition of welfare would in some sense represent an ethic and that ethics must necessarily be of that mathematical form.
The paper here is not the place to explore the merits or demerits of all these views. Only those which might serve as a basis for formalizing some concept of "path independence" will be examined. The views above are outlined and isolated so that they need not be interjected here as the argument proceeds. It should be pointed out now that part of the discussion which follows presupposes a conceptualization as to the purpose of social choice theory which differs slightly from that presupposed in the discussions above. The problem is not viewed here as one of defining a social preference. Rather, it is seen as one of designing processes for which the choice function, C(v), has "nice" features. The focus is, in part, upon whether or not the institutions available offer sufficient flexibility to permit a "successful" design.
In the next two sections we will present two separate classes of arguments. Both are motivated by the idea that social choice should, in some sense, be independent of previous choices. Throughout the paper we will assume that E is finite and C(Q) + 0 for all nonempty subsets of E.
DIVIDE AND CONQUER
The first motivation stems from the observation that the process of choosing, from a dynamic point of view, frequently proceeds in a type of "divide and conquer" manner. The alternatives are "split up" into smaller sets, a choice is made over each of these sets, the chosen elements are collected, and then a choice result would be independent of the way the alternatives were initially divided up for consideration.
Clearly, this could be a description of either individual choice or social choice. The case of social choice might be of special interest, however, where the outcomes that should result when the process is functioning "correctly" have been prespecified and the welfare economist is charged with the responsibility of creating or repairing the process in a manner which assures that the pre-specified outcomes will, in fact, occur. A problem of path independence can arise in this case from what appears to be fundamental limitations on institutions. For example, the concept of "majority rule," inherently, refers to a choice over a two-element set. The idea of a proposal either "passing" or "failing" is, at base, binary. Without pursuing this much further, one can easily imagine a group restricting deliberations to four or five issues at a time because of overriding considerations relating to communication costs and other logistical problems. If the institutions a welfare economist has at his disposal for the creation of social choice processes can only operate on "small" sets, how then can he create a choosing process which will handle a "non-small" set? The answer is simple. If the institutions will operate on any "small" set, he can apply them repeatedly. He would thereby "extend" choice from smaller sets to a choice over the non-small set. For example, if his institutions operated on any set with five elements or less, he would split a larger set into smaller sets of five elements or less and then proceed as above to choose, collect choices, and choose again. Now, if he can design the process so that the outcomes are independent of the initial groupings, that parameter, "path," is one less that he has to worry about. Suppose individuals 1, 2, and 3 have, respectively, preference relations x >-y >-z, y >-z >-x, and z > x >-y. Suppose further that the process he is to create, in this case, must yield x as the outcome. If he can only use the binary process of majority rule and if he has no control over the parameter, "path," then it would appear that he has an unsolvable problem.
Let us proceed now, and make the idea of path independence formal. We proceed as follows. Assume E is a finite set. Let V = {v1, .. , vm } The axiom says we can choose over S directly or arbitrarily segment S, choose over the parts, and then choose over the choices without changing the ultimate result. Notice that the property holds for all S so one can further refine the segments without worry.
Before proceeding further, it would perhaps be instructive to make some remarks which will help the reader understand the structure of the axiom. These first two remarks establish that I.P. alone is completely divorced from the concept of social rationality. In order to prove this theorem we need two lemmas. 
Clearly S = UY9v v {[Uv9v v] u [Uvev C(v)]} so application of I.P.' yields C(S) = C(C(Uvev v) u C(Uv.v C(v))), or simply, C(S) = C(C(S) u C(UvY,v C(v))).

Now apply Lemma 2 to get C(S) = C(C(Uvev C(v))) and Lemma 1 to get C(S) =
C(UvQ-v C(v)) which is, since S and V were arbitrary, a statement of I.P. Therefore, C(. ) satisfies I.P.
Consider now I.P." Let C(.) satisfy I.P. We have then, for all v1 and v2, C(v1 u v2) = C(C(v1)u C(v2)). Apply Lemma 1 to get C(v1 u v2) = C(C(v1) u C(C(v2))) and from the definition of I.P. we get (VVl)v, E(VV2)V2 E[C(Vl U V2) = C(V1 U C(V2))],
which is a statement of I.P."
Suppose now that C( ) satisfies I.P." We have then (Vv1)(Vv2)[C(v1 u v2) = C(v1 u C(v2))]. Let f1 = v1 and P2 = C(v2), and apply I.P.' to get C(v1 u v2) = C(v1 u v2) = C(C(v1) V2) = C(C(v1) u C(v2)) which is, since v1 and v2 were unrestricted, a statement of I.P.' We have already shown that I.P.' implies I.P., so we are finished.
Q.E.D.
The mathematical structure underlying path independence concepts such as these, appears to be, at this time, the associative law. The following theorem makes an appropriate connection with something about which a lot is known from a mathematical point of view. The connection made here might provide the proper avenue to follow if one wants to drop the finiteness restriction or perform some other generalization. C(C(v1) u C(v2)) = C(C(v2) u  C(v1) ), i.e., v1 V2 = V2 v1. We need only establish the remaining propertyassociativity. We seek to show that (6) Vi * (vJ Vk) = (Vi*Vj) Vk for all i,j, k.
PROOF: Closure, v1 V2 E (E) for all V1, V2 E g(E), is satisfied since C(v) is defined for all v. Commutativity is immediate since
First note that application of Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 yields An application of (7) Simply note that (11) and (12) imply (6) and the result is established.
Q.E.D.
We can now move to a consideration of the relationship between path independence and concepts of preference. The following two theorems, Theorems 3 and 4, use I.P. plus another axiom to characterize a necessary and sufficient condition for a choice function to have a quasi-transitive rationalization. Theorem 5 demonstrates that where the choice is always just one element, path independent choice is equivalent to having a weak order rationalization.
Consider the following axiom: R is a total, reflexive, transitive relation. Q.E.D.
EXTENSION (E): (VS)SZE[{x E S & (Vy)yEsx E C({X, y})} -
"HISTORY-FREE" CHOICE
The second class of motivations for path independence stems from a different but less precise demand when compared to the discussion above. Arrow's original mention of path independence occurs when he is discussing biases in favor of the status quo which, itself, could be the result of the accidental forces of history. He sees "social deadlock" or "paralysis" [6] as something to be avoided in favor of "full adaptability to varying environments" [2, p. 120]. The status quo, or history, should play no dominant role in the determination of choice. This is a most perplexing argument since the simplest way to assure that the status quo is not favored is to make sure that the choice function is not parameterized by such a variable. Such parameters can be introduced [10], but they have absolutely nothing to do with rational choice or path independence. The perplexing thing is that no such parameters ever appear in Arrow. The choice from a set is always independent of the status quo in his formulation. That is, in the Arrow formulation the choice from a given set can be the same regardless of the alternative indexed as the status quo and regardless of whether or not the process satisfies some type of rationality condition.
That said, however, the matter can still be pursued. Suppose a social choice process is viewed as "working its way" through the elements of v and then "choosing." Suppose the agenda is changed from v1 to v2 . Since all of the elements of v1 have been "examined," it would seem "rational" to eliminate the problem of 'examining" and "considering" those elements of v, still available, as well as the new ones, in order to determine C(v2). We could view the reason for this requirement as being some type of "computational efficiency" argument.
Two separate axioms are offered as formalizations of this rather loose idea. The reader should also consider I.P." with these interpretations in mind. Axiom 1 is very "close" to I.P.', and thus it is "close" to I.P. However, it still differs in an important way. Axiom 1 says that if you take a set and partition it into two parts, the outcome of the resulting sequence of choices is independent of the particular partition; whereas I-P.' is exactly the same except that the two initial subsets need not necessarily form a partition the sets might "overlap." Q.E.D.
We return now to the ideas which motivated this section and present one final axiom. Suppose we demand that the only information one retains about the current agenda is the choice. If the agenda changes, we might demand the new choice be determined in a contest between previous choices still available and the new opportunities.
Formally, the idea is stated as follows:
AxIOM 2: C({x, y, z}) . So, x E C({x, z}).
Define yRb if and only if y E C({y, 3}
). Since C(.) is defined for all two-element sets, R is total and reflexive (by convention). From the above result R is transitive. We show R "rationalizes" C( ).
Suppose x E C(S) but for some y E S, x 0 C({x, y}). We then get, contrary to the axiom, in violation of our assumption. We conclude x E C(S) if x E C({x, y}) for all y E S but since x e C({x, y}) if xRy, we conclude R is a rationalization. Proof of the second half is left to the reader.
IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS
We can now turn to a consideration of Arrow's major theorem. One of the conditions he requires in his structure is that the social choice function must be total, reflexive, transitive, and rational. The various motivations for this restriction have been reviewed above.
If we replace his consistency conditions with I.P., his impossibility results do not follow. In fact, we can, in addition to I.P., require E without an impossibility result. An example is provided by Sen [14, Theorem V] which, in view of Theorem 4 here, has the requisite properties.
The example given by Sen is the process that always chooses all Pareto optimal alternatives. Such a process has a quasi-transitive rationalization and thus satisfies I.P. and E. Of course, to some this might not be a very exciting example. Notice, however, that there is no need of requiring the property E, and the removal of this admits additional examples. In fact, there appears to be no overriding reason to impose even I.P. at the very outset of the analysis, even though special considerations make I.P. appear to be a potentially useful tool.
The point is, then, that the path independent line of argument yields no general support for the imposition of rationality conditions on social choice. Support for the rationality condition must be based on some other line of argument, such as one of those outlined in the first section. If no real justification resides there either, then the obvious thing to do is drop the concept of social rationality and apply the tools that remain toward some positive end. 
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